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Identifies FAILED or denied attempts to manipulate AWS CloudTrail, CloudWatch/EventBridge, or VPC Flow Logs. Successful manipulation is covered by the higher-severity 'AWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS CloudTrail Logs' rule. These failed attempts can indicate reconnaissance or an actor probing for insufficient permissions as part of defense evasion. For more information, visit: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html A
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | Analytic Rule |
| Solution | Amazon Web Services |
| ID | 610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5 |
| Severity | Low |
| Status | Available |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Tactics | DefenseEvasion |
| Techniques | T1562.008 |
| Required Connectors | AWS, AWSS3 |
| Source | View on GitHub |
This content item queries data from the following tables:
| Table | Selection Criteria | Transformations | Ingestion API | Lake-Only |
|---|---|---|---|---|
AWSCloudTrail |
EventName in "DeleteEventBus,DeleteFlowLogs,DeleteLogGroup,DeleteTrail,StopLogging,UpdateTrail" |
✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
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